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Almost immediately after taking office, the Obama administration charged the U.S. 
Department of State’s Advisory Committee on International Economic Policy with reviewing the 
U.S. Model bilateral investment treaty (BIT).  The group established a sub-committee of 
business groups, labor and environmental organizations, and a handful of academic experts and 
tasked it to make official recommendations for reforming U.S. investment treaties.  When 
completed, the Obama Administration hopes to proceed with official negotiations with China, 
India, Vietnam, and possibly Brazil.  
In light of the global financial crisis, one of the specific issues that the administration 
asked the subcommittee to address was the potential impact of BIT provisions on the ability of 
governments to prevent and mitigate financial crises.  Financial stability was one of the few areas 
in which a consensus recommendation was reached—the subcommittee asked the administration 
to undertake a legal review of the prudential measures exception (Article 20 of the U.S. Model 
BIT).1  In most recent U.S. treaties that exception states that parties to the treaty should “not be 
prevented from adopting or maintaining measures … to ensure the integrity and stability of the 
financial system.”  However, the paragraph ends with the following sentence: “Where such 
measures do not conform with the provisions of this Treaty, they shall not be used as a means of 
avoiding the Party’s commitments or obligations under this Treaty.” Some on the subcommittee 
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thought the language was vague and in need of clarification.  Others echoed the concerns of legal 
scholars2 who argue that the sentences were self-canceling and in need of deletion. 
Given the high degree of contention among committee members, the report includes an 
annex in which individual members or subgroups provided additional arguments.  A group of 
sub-committee members (that included myself) recommented that the Administration conduct a 
legal review of the potential that any of the measures implemented or under consideration in 
response to the financial crisis  might be inconsistent with the 2004 Model BIT, and made three 
specific recommendations that should be implemented by the U.S. in a revised Model BIT:  
   
1.  Codify the State Department’s position in Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United States regarding 
the standard of proof for identifying principles of customary international law and the 
minimum standard of treatment.  
   Financial bailout measures, or future preventative measures that create “too big too fail” 
regulations, could be challenged under the 2004 BIT on the grounds that they deny a foreign 
investor’s right to fair and equitable treatment and a minimum standard of treatment. Indeed, a 
Dutch subsidiary of a Japanese bank recently argued that the Czech Republic had violated its 
rights by extending its bailout program only to “too big to fail” Czech banks, excluding a small 
bank in which the Dutch subsidiary had invested.3  In addition to ensuring that the prudential 
exception is broad enough, codifying the Glamis position, which prevailed with a narrow 
interpretation of customary international law and minimum standard of treatment, will set a 
better standard for preventing and mitigating crises.    
   
2. Include a safeguard provision for balance-of-payments crises that is not subject to 
investor-state dispute settlement.  
   U.S. investment treaties essentially force nations to liberalize their capital accounts, 
regardless of their institutional capacity -- or be prepared literally to pay the consequences.  This 
stands in stark contrast with economic science and most other global treaties.  Ayhan Kose of the 
IMF, Eswar Prasad of Cornell University and Ashley Taylor of the World Bank confirm that 
capital account liberalization is not correlated with economic growth in developing countries. 
These authors expand such findings to show that capital account liberalization only works for 
those nations above a certain threshold of economic and institutional development.4  Capital 
controls have been shown to be an effective measure to prevent or mitigate a crisis and such a 
safeguard mechanism leaving governments room to impose capital controls under certain 
circumstances can be found in virtually every other form of international economic law, such as 
the WTO, OECD codes (and the draft MAI), and the BITs of most other capital exporting 
nations. 
 
3. Exclude “sovereign debt” from “definitions” of an investment.  
   The U.S. Model BIT does not explicitly exclude sovereign debt from the definition of 
covered investments, as NAFTA does.  It should. The U.S. government is the largest issuer of 
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sovereign debt, and countries across the world have taken on much debt to get out of the 
financial crises and could risk default.  As noted in the full subcommitee report, the IMF and 
others have raised concerns that efforts to restructure sovereign debt may give rise to investor-
state claims. New model investment provisions should not obstruct global efforts to set up 
adequate facilities for sovereign debt restructuring that could be undermined if bondholders are 
able to circumvent such mechanisms by filing claims under BITs.   At minimum, the model BIT 
should codify U.S.-Peru FTA- like provisions that limit an investor's ability to bring an investor-
State claim based on a debt restructuring where holders of 75% or more of the outstanding debt 
have agreed to the restructuring. 
Ensuring that the U.S. model is in tune with global efforts to prevent and mitigate 
financial crises benefits both the U.S. and its investment partners.   Making sure that ample 
prudential exceptions exist can buffer the U.S. from liabilities for prudential regulations. What’s 
more, stability among our investment partners helps U.S. investors and exporters have more 
certainty for markets.  Crises could lead to defaults and large losses to U.S. assets and export 
markets.  And, crises can cause contagion that spreads to other U.S. investment and export 
destinations.  Trade and investment treaties should not prevail over regulations for financial 
stability in the U.S. and abroad.   
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